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Abstract
In the framework of distributed network computing, it is known that, for every network
predicate, each network configuration that satisfies this predicate can be proved using dis-
tributed certificates which can be verified locally. However, this requires to leak information
about the identities of the nodes in the certificates, which might not be applicable in a
context in which privacy is desirable. Unfortunately, it is known that if one insists on cer-
tificates independent of the node identities, then not all network predicates can be proved
using distributed certificates that can be verified locally. In this paper, we prove that, for ev-
ery network predicate, there is a distributed protocol satisfying the following two properties:
(1) for every network configuration that is legal w.r.t. the predicate, and for any attempt by
an adversary to prove the illegality of that configuration using distributed certificates, there
is a locally verifiable proof that the adversary is wrong, also using distributed certificates;
(2) for every network configuration that is illegal w.r.t. the predicate, there is a proof of that
illegality, using distributed certificates, such that no matter the way an adversary assigns its
own set of distributed certificates in an attempt to prove the legality of the configuration, the
actual illegality of the configuration will be locally detected. In both cases, the certificates
are independent of the identities of the nodes. These results are achieved by investigating
the so-called local hierarchy of complexity classes in which the certificates do not exploit the
node identities. Indeed, we give a characterization of such a hierarchy, which is of its own
interest
∗The first, third and fourth authors received additional supports from the ANR project DISPLEXITY.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Context and objective
In the framework of distributed network computing, local decision is the ability to check the
legality of network configurations using a local distributed algorithm. This concern is of the
utmost importance in the context of fault-tolerant distributed computing, where it is highly
desirable that the nodes are able to collectively check the legality of their current configuration,
which could have been altered by the corruption of variables due to failures. In this paper,
we insist on locality, as we want the checking protocols to avoid involving long-distance com-
munications across the network, for they are generally costly and potentially unreliable. More
specifically, we consider the standard LOCAL model of computation in networks [14]. Nodes
are assumed to be given distinct identities, and each node executes the same algorithm, which
proceeds in synchronous rounds where all nodes start at the same time. In each round, every
node sends messages to its neighbors, receives messages from its neighbors, and performs some
individual computation. The model does not limit the amount of data sent in the messages,
neither it limits the amount of computation that is performed by a node during a round. Indeed,
the model places emphasis on the number of rounds before every node can output, as a measure
of locality. (Note however that, up to some exceptions, our positive results involves messages
of logarithmic size, and polynomial-time computation). A local algorithm is a distributed algo-
rithm A satisfying that there exists a constant t ≥ 0 such that A terminates in at most t rounds
in all networks, for all inputs. The parameter t is called the radius of A. In other words, in
every network G, and for all inputs to the nodes of G, every node executing A just needs to
collect all information present in its t-ball around it in order to output, where the t-ball of u is
the ball BG(u, t) = {v ∈ V (G) : dist(u, v) ≤ t}.
Following the guidelines of [6], we define a configuration as a pair (G, x) where G = (V,E)
is a connected simple graph, and x : V (G) → {0, 1}∗ is a function assigning an input x(u) to
every node u ∈ V . A distributed language L is a Turing-decidable set of configurations. Note
that the membership of a configuration to a distributed language is independent of the identity
that may be assigned to the nodes in the LOCAL model (as one may want to study the same
language under different computational models, including ones that assume anonymous nodes).
The class LD is the set of all distributed languages that are locally decidable. That is, LD is the
class of all distributed languages L for which there exists a local algorithm A satisfying that,
for every configuration (G, x),
(G, x) ∈ L ⇐⇒ A accepts (G, x)
where one says that A accepts if it accepts at all nodes. More formally, given a graph G, let
ID(G) denote the set of all possible identity assignments to the nodes of G (with distinct non-
negative integers). Then LD is the class of all distributed languages L for which there exists a
local algorithm A satisfying the following: for every configuration (G, x),
(G, x) ∈ L ⇒ ∀id ∈ ID(G),∀u ∈ V (G),A(G, x, id, u) = accept
(G, x) /∈ L ⇒ ∀id ∈ ID(G),∃u ∈ V (G),A(G, x, id, u) = reject
where A(G, x, id, u) is the output of Algorithm A running on the instance (G, x) with identity-
assignment id, at node u. For instance, the language prop-col, composed of all (connected)
properly colored graphs, is in LD. Similarly, the class LCL of “locally checkable labelings”,
defined in [13], satisfies LCL ⊆ LD. In fact, LCL is precisely LD restricted to configurations on
graphs with constant maximum degree, and inputs of constant size.
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The class NLD is the non-deterministic version of LD, i.e., the class of all distributed lan-
guages L for which there exists a local algorithm A verifying L, i.e., satisfying that, for every
configuration (G, x),
(G, x) ∈ L ⇐⇒ ∃c,A accepts (G, x) with certificate c.
More formally, NLD is the class of all distributed languages L for which there exists a local
algorithm A satisfying the following: for every configuration (G, x),
(G, x) ∈ L ⇒ ∃c ∈ C(G),∀id ∈ ID(G), ∀u ∈ V (G),A(G, x, c, id, u) = accepts
(G, x) /∈ L ⇒ ∀c ∈ C(G),∀id ∈ ID(G), ∃u ∈ V (G),A(G, x, c, id, u) = rejects
where C(G) is the class of all functions c : V (G) → {0, 1}∗, assigning certificate c(u) to each
node u. Note that the certificates c may depend on the network and the input to the nodes,
but should be set independently of the actual identity assignment to the nodes of the network.
This guarantees that no information is revealed about far away nodes in the network by the
certificates, hence preserving some form of privacy. In the following, for the sake of simplifying
the notations, we shall omit specifying the domain sets C(G) and ID(G) unless they are not
clear from the context.
It follows from the above that NLD is a class of distributed languages that can be locally
verified, in the sense that, on legal instances, certificates can be assigned to nodes by a prover
so that a verifier A accepts, and, on illegal instances, the verifier A rejects (i.e., at least one
node rejects) systematically, and cannot be fooled by any fake certificate. For instance, the
language tree = {(G, x) : G is a tree} is in NLD, by selecting a root r of the given tree, and
assigning to each node u a counter c(u) equal to its hop-distance to r. If the given (connected)
graph contains a cycle, then no counters could be assigned to fool an algorithm checking that,
at each node u with c(u) 6= 0, a unique neighbor v satisfies c(v) < c(u). In [5], NLD was proved
to be exactly the class of distributed languages that are closed under lift.
Finally, [6] defined the randomized versions BPLDp,q and BPNLDp,q, of the aforementioned
classes LD and NLD, respectively, by replacing the use of a deterministic algorithm with the use
of a randomized algorithm characterized by its probability p of acceptance for legal instances,
and its probability q of rejection for illegal instances. By defining BPNLD = ∪p2+q≥1BPNLDp,q,
the landscape of local decision was pictured as follows:
LD ⊂ NLD ⊂ BPNLD = All
where all inclusions are strict, and All is the set of all distributed languages. That is, every
distributed language can be locally verified with constant success probabilities p and q, for
some p and q satisfying p2 + q ≥ 1. In other words, by combining non-determinism with
randomization, one can decide any given distributed language. However, this holds only up to
a certain guaranty of success, which is only guarantied to satisfy p2 + q ≥ 1.
1.2 Our contributions
Following up the approach recently applied to distributed graph automata in [15], we observe
that the class LD and NLD are in fact the basic levels of a “local hierarchy” defined as follows.
Let ΣLOC0 = Π
LOC
0 = LD, and, for k ≥ 1, let ΣLOCk be the class of all distributed languages L for
which there exists a local algorithm A satisfying that, for every configuration (G, x),
(G, x) ∈ L ⇐⇒ ∃c1,∀c2, . . . , Qck,A accepts (G, x) with certificates c1, c2, . . . , ck
where the quantifiers alternate, and Q is the universal quantifier if k is even, and the existential
one if k is odd. The class ΠLOCk is defined similarly, by starting with a universal quantifier,
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Figure 1: Relations between the different decision classes of the local hierarchy (the definitions
of the various languages can be found in the text).
instead of an existential one. A local algorithm A insuring membership to a class C ∈ {ΣLOCk , k ≥
0} ∪ {ΠLOCk , k ≥ 0} is called a C-algorithm. Hence, NLD = ΣLOC1 , and, for instance, ΠLOC2 is the
class of all distributed languages L for which there exists a ΠLOC2 -algorithm, that is, a local
algorithm A satisfying the following: for every configuration (G, x),
(G, x) ∈ L ⇒ ∀c1, ∃c2,∀id, ∀u ∈ V (G),A(G, x, c1, c2, id, u) = accept;
(G, x) /∈ L ⇒ ∃c1, ∀c2,∀id, ∃u ∈ V (G),A(G, x, c1, c2, id, u) = reject. (1)
Our main results are the following.
Theorem 1 LD ⊂ ΠLOC1 ⊂ NLD = ΣLOC2 ⊂ ΠLOC2 = All, where all inclusions are strict.
That is, ΠLOC1 ⊃ ΠLOC0 , while ΣLOC2 = ΣLOC1 , and the whole local hierarchy collapses to the second
level, at ΠLOC2 . This collapsing has a significant impact on our ability to certify the legality,
or correctness of a network configuration w.r.t. any (Turing decidable) boolean predicate on
networks. Indeed, ΠLOC2 = All says that, for every network predicate, there is a distributed
protocol satisfying the following two properties:
1. For every network configuration that is legal w.r.t. the predicate, and for any attempt by an
adversary to prove the illegality of that configuration using distributed certificates, there
is a locally verifiable proof that the adversary is wrong, also using distributed certificates,
whose setting is independent of the node identities.
2. For every network configuration that is illegal w.r.t. the predicate, there is a proof of that
illegality, using distributed certificates whose setting is independent of the node identities,
such that no matter the way an adversary assigns its own set of distributed certificates in
an attempt to prove the legality of the configuration, the actual illegality of the configu-
ration will be locally detected.
We complete our description of the local hierarchy by a collection of separation and com-
pleteness results regarding the different classes and co-classes in the hierarchy. In particular, we
revisit the completeness results in [6], and show that the notion of reduction introduced in this
latter paper is too strong, and may allow a language outside NLD to be reduced to a language
in NLD. We introduce a more restricted form of local reduction, called label-preserving, which
does not have this undesirable property, and we establish the following.
Theorem 2 NLD and ΠLOC2 have complete distributed languages for local label-preserving reduc-
tions.
Finally, Figure 1 summarizes all our separation results.
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1.3 Related Work
Several form of “local hierarchies” have been investigated in the literature, with the objective
of understanding the power of local computation, and/or for the purpose of designing verifi-
cation mechanisms for fault-tolerant computing. In particular, [15] has investigated the case
of distributed graph automata, where the nodes are finite automata, and the network is anony-
mous (which are weaker assumptions than those in our setting), but also assuming an arbitrary
global interpretation of the individual decisions of the nodes (which is a stronger assumption
than those in our setting). It is shown that all levels ΣAUTk , k ≥ 0, of the resulting hierarchy are
separated, and that the whole local hierarchy is exactly composed of the MSO (monadic second
order) formulas on graphs.
In the framework of distributed computing, where the computing entities are Turing ma-
chines, proof-labeling schemes (PLS) [8], extended to locally checkable proofs (LCP) [7], give the
ability to certify predicates using certificates that can take benefits of the node identities. That
is, for the same network predicate, and the same legal network configuration, the distributed
proof that this configuration is legal may be different if the node identities are different. In this
context, the whole hierarchy collapses at the first level, with ΣLCP1 = All. However, this holds
only if the certificates can be as large as Ω(n2) bits. In [2], the class LogLCP [7], which bounds
the certificate to be of size O(log n) bits is extended to a hierarchy. In particular, it is shown
that MST stands at the second level ΠLogLCP2 of that hierarchy, while there are languages outside
the hierarchy.
In [6], the authors introduced the model investigated in this paper. In particular, they
defined and characterized the class NLD, which is noting else than ΣLOC1 , that is, the class
of languages that have a proof-labeling scheme in which the certificates are not depending
on the node identities. It is proved that, while NLD 6= All, randomization helps a lot, as the
randomized version BPNLD of NLD satisfies BPNLD = All. It is also proved that, with the oracle
#nodes providing each node with the number of nodes in the network, we get NLD#nodes = All.
Interestingly, it was proved [5] that restricting the verification algorithms for NLD to be identity-
oblivious, that is, enforcing that each node decides the same output for every identity-assignment
to the nodes in the network, does not reduce the ability to verify languages. This is summarized
by the equality NLDO = NLD where the “O” in NLDO stands for identity-oblivious. Instead, it
was recently proved that restricting the algorithms to be identity-oblivious reduces the ability
to decide languages locally, i.e., LDO ( LD (see [4]).
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the ability to decide a distributed language locally has
impact on the ability to design construction algorithms [12] for that language (i.e., computing
outputs x such that the configuration (G, x) is legal w.r.t. the specification of the task). For
instance, it is known that if L is locally decidable, then any randomized local construction
algorithm for L can be derandomized [13]. This result has been recently extended [1] to the
case of languages that are locally decidable by a randomized algorithm (i.e., extended from LD
to BPLD according to the notations in [6]). More generally, the reader is invited to consult [3, 9,
10, 11, 14, 16] for good introductions to local computing, and/or samples of significant results
related to local computing.
2 All languages are ΠLOC2 decidable
In this section, we show the last equality of Theorem 1.
Proposition 3 ΠLOC2 = All.
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Proof. Let L be a distributed language. We give an explicit ΠLOC2 -algorithm for L, i.e., a
local algorithm A such that, for every configuration (G, x), Eq. (1) is satisfied. For this pur-
pose, we describe the distributed certificates c1 and c2. Intuitively, the certificate c1 aims at
convincing each node that (G, x) 6∈ L, while c2 aims at demonstrating the opposite. More
precisely, at each node u in a configuration (G, x), the certificate c1(u) is interpreted as a triple
(M(u),data(u), index(u)) where M(u) is an m ×m boolean matrix, data(u) is a linear array
with m entries, and index(u) ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Informally, c1(u) aims at proving to node u that it
is node labeled index(u) in the m-node graph with adjacency matrix M(u), and that the whole
input data is data(u). We denote by n the number of nodes of the actual graph G.
For a legal configuration (G, x) ∈ L, given c1, the certificate c2 is then defined as follows.
It is based on the identification of a few specific nodes, that we call witnesses. Intuitively, a
witness is a node enabling to demonstrate that the structure of the configuration (G, x) does
not fit with the given certificate c1. Let dist(u, v) denote the distance between any two nodes u
and v in the actual network G, that is, dist(u, v) equals the number of edges of a shortest path
between u and v in G. A certificate c2(u) is of the form (f(u), σ(u)) where f(u) ∈ {0, . . . , 4} is
a flag, and σ(u) ∈ {0, 1}∗ depends on the value of the flag.
– Case 0: There are two adjacent nodes v 6= v′ such that (M(v), data(v)) 6= (M(v′),data(v′)),
or there are nodes v in which c1(v) cannot be read as a triple (M(v), data(v), index(v)). Then
we set one of these nodes as witness w, and we set c2(u) = (0,dist(u,w)) at every node u.
Otherwise, i.e., if the pair (M(u),data(u)) is identical to some pair (M,data) at every node u:
– Case 1: (G, x) is isomorphic to (M,data), preserving the inputs, denoted by (G, x) ∼
(M,data), and index() is injective. Then we set c2(u) = (1) at every node u.
– Case 2: n > m, i.e., |V (G)| is larger than the dimension m of M , or index() is not injective.
Then we set the certificate c2(u) = (2, i, d(u,w), d(u,w
′)) where i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and w 6= w′ are
two distinct nodes such that index(w) = index(w′) = i. These two nodes w and w′ are both
witnesses.
– Case 3: n < m and index() is injective. Then we set c2(u) = (3, i) where i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} is
such that index(v) 6= i for every node v.
– Case 4: n = m and index() is injective, but (G, x) is not isomorphic to (M,data). Then
we set as witness a node w whose neighborhood in (G, x) does not fit with what it should be
according to (M, data), and we set c2(u) = (4, d(u,w)) for every node u.
The local verification algorithm A then proceeds as follows. First, every node u checks
whether its flag f(u) in c2(u) is identical to all the ones of its neighbors, and between 0 and 4.
If not, then u rejects. Otherwise, u carries on executing the verification procedure. Its behavior
depends on the value of its flag.
– If f(u) = 0, then u checks that at least one of its neighbors has a distance to the witness
that is smaller than its own distance. A node with distance 0 to the witness checks that there
is indeed an inconsistency with its c1 certificate (i.e., its c1 certificate cannot be read as a pair
matrix-data, or its c1 certificate is distinct from the one of its neighbors). Every node accepts
or rejects accordingly.
– If f(u) = 1, then u accepts or rejects according to whether (M(u), data(u)) ∈ L (recall that,
by definition, we consider only distributed languages L that are Turing-decidable).
– If f(u) = 2, then u checks that it has the same index i in its certificate c2 as all its neighbors.
If that is not the case, then it rejects. Otherwise, it checks each of the two distances in its
certificate c2 separately, each one as in the case where f(u) = 0. A node with one of the two
distances equal to 0 also checks that its c1 index is equal to the index i in c2. If that is not
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the case, or if its two distances are equal to 0, then it rejects. If all the test are passed, then u
accepts.
– If f(u) = 3, then u accepts if and only if it has the same index i in its c2 certificate as all its
neighbors, and index(u) 6= i.
– If f(u) = 4, then u checks the distances as in the case where f(u) = 0. A node with distance 0
also checks that its neighborhood in the actual configuration (G, x) is not what it should be
according to (M,data). It accepts or rejects accordingly.
To prove the correctness of this Algorithm A, let us first consider a legal configuration
(G, x) ∈ L. We show that the way c2 is defined guarantees that all nodes accept, because c2
correctly pinpoints inconsistencies in c1, witnessing any attempt of c1 to certify that the actual
configuration is illegal. Indeed, in Case 0, by the setting of c2, all nodes but the witness accept.
Also, the witness itself accepts because it does witness the inconsistency of the c1 certificate.
In Case 1, then all nodes accept because (G, x) ∼ (M, data) and (G, x) ∈ L. In Case 2, by
the setting of c2, all nodes but the witnesses accept, and the witnesses accept too because each
one checks that it is the vertex with index i in M . In Case 3, all nodes accept by construction
of the certificate c2. Finally, in Case 4, by the setting of c2, all nodes but the witness accept.
Also, the witness itself accepts because, as in Case 0, it does witness the inconsistency of the
c1 certificate. So, in all cases, all nodes accept, as desired.
We are now left with the case of illegal configurations. Let (G, x) /∈ L be such an illegal
configuration. We set c1(u) = (M, data, index(u)) where (M,data) ∼ (G, x) and index(u) is the
index of node u in the adjacency matrix M and the array data. We show that, for any certificate
c2, at least one node rejects. Indeed, for all nodes to accept, they need to have the same flag
in c2. This flag cannot be 1 because, if f(u) = 1 then u checks the legality of (M, data). In
all other cases, the distance checking should be passed at all nodes for them to accept. Thus,
the flag is distinct from 0 and 4 because every radius-1 ball in (G, x) fits with its description
in (M,data). Also, the flag is distinct from 2 because there are no two distinct nodes with the
same index i in the c1 certificate. Finally, also the flag is distinct from 3, because, by the setting
of c1, every index in {1, . . . , n} appears at some node, and this node would reject. Hence, all
cases lead to contradiction, that is, not all nodes can accept, as desired. 
To conclude the section, let us define a simple problem in ΠLOC2 \NLD. Let exts, which stands
for “exactly two selected” be the following language. We set (G, x) ∈ exts if x(u) ∈ {⊥,>} for
every u ∈ V (G), and |{u ∈ V (G) : x(u) = >}| = 2. Proving that exts /∈ NLD is easy using the
following characterization of NLD. Let t ≥ 1. A configuration (G′, x′) is a t-lift of a configuration
(G, x) iff there exists a mapping φ : V (G′)→ V (G) such that, for every u ∈ V (G′), BG(φ(u), t)
is isomorphic to BG′(u, t), preserving inputs. A distributed language L is closed under lift if
there exists t ≥ 1 such that, for every (G, x), we have (G, x) ∈ L implies (G′, x′) ∈ L for every
(G′, x′) that is a t-lift of (G, x).
Lemma 4 ([5]) NLD is the class of distributed languages closed under lift.
Since exts is not closed under lift, it results from Lemma 4 that exts /∈ NLD.
3 On the impact of the last universal quantifier
In this section, we prove the part of Theorem 1 related to the two classes ΠLOC1 and Σ
LOC
2 . These
two classes have in common that the universal quantifier is positioned last. It results that these
two classes seem to be limited, as witnessed by the following two propositions.
Proposition 5 ΣLOC2 = NLD.
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Proof. By Lemma 4, it is sufficient to prove that, for any L ∈ ΣLOC2 , L is closed under lift.
If L ∈ ΣLOC2 then let A be a local algorithm establishing the membership of L in ΣLOC2 . A is
satisfying the following. For every (G, x) ∈ L,
∃c1,∀c2,∀id,∀u ∈ V (G),A(G, x, c1, c2, id, u) = accept.
Let t be the radius of A, and assume, for the purpose of contradiction, that L is not closed
under lift. There exists (G, x) ∈ L, and a t-lift (G′, x′) of (G, x) with (G′, x′) /∈ L. Let
φ : V (G′) → V (G) be this t-lift. Note that the t-balls in (G, x) are identical to the t-balls in
(G′, x′) by definition of a t-lift. Let c1 be the distributed certificate that makes A accept (G, x)
at all nodes, for all certificates c2. Let c
′
1 be the distributed certificate for (G
′, x′) defined by
c′1(u) = c1(φ(u)). Since, with certificate c1, A accepts at all nodes of G, for every certificate c2,
and for every identity assignment, it follows that, with certificate c′1, A accepts at all nodes of
G′, for every certificate c′2, and for every identity assignment, contradicting the correctness of A.
Therefore, L is closed under lift. Thus, ΣLOC2 ⊆ NLD. Since, by definition, NLD = ΣLOC1 ⊆ ΣLOC2 ,
the result follows. 
To show that ΠLOC1 6= NLD, we consider the language alts, which stands for “at least two
selected”. (Note that alts is the complement of the language amos introduced in [6], where
amos stands for “at most one selected”). We set (G, x) ∈ alts if x(u) ∈ {⊥,>} for every node
u ∈ V (G), and |{u ∈ V (G) : x(u) = >}| ≥ 2. Note that alts ∈ NLD \ΠLOC1 .
Proposition 6 ΠLOC1 ⊂ NLD (the inclusion is strict).
Proof. By Lemma 4, to establish ΠLOC1 ⊆ NLD, it is sufficient to prove that, for any L ∈ ΠLOC1 ,
L is closed under lift. The arguments are exactly similar to the ones used in the proof of
Proposition 5 without even the need to lift a first set of certificates. To show that ΠLOC1 6= NLD,
we consider the language alts. We have alts ∈ NLD because alts is closed under lift. However,
alts /∈ ΠLOC1 . Indeed, assume that there exists a local algorithm A for alts ∈ ΠLOC1 . Then,
consider the cycle Cn, and three distinct nodes u, v, w in Cn equally spread at distance n/3.
Let us fix a set of certificates, say c(u) = ∅ for every node u. A cannot be correct for all eight
configurations resulting from the two possible input assignments ⊥ or > to the three nodes
u, v, w. 
While ΠLOC1 is in NLD, the universal quantifier does add some power compared to LD. We
show that LD 6= ΠLOC1 by exhibiting a language in ΠLOC1 \ LD. Note that the existence of this
language is not straightforward as it must involve Turing-computability issues. Indeed, if one
does not insist on the fact that the local algorithm must be a Turing-computable function, then
the two classes LD and ΠLOC1 would be identical. For instance, given a t-round algorithm A
deciding a language L in ΠLOC1 , one could define the following function f for deciding the same
language in LD. Given a t-ball B centered at u, node u accepts with f if and only if there are
no certificate assignments to the nodes of B that could lead A to reject at u. The function f is
however not an algorithm. We show that, in fact, ΠLOC1 \ LD 6= ∅.
Proposition 7 LD ⊂ ΠLOC1 where the inclusion is strict.
Proof. We describe the distributed language iter, which stands for “iteration”. Let M be
a Turing machine, and let us enumerate lexicographically all the states of the system tape-
machine where M starts its execution on the blank tape, with the head at the beginning of the
tape. We define the function fM : N→ N by fM (0) = 0, fM (1) = 1, and, for i > 1, fM (i) equal
to the index of the system state after one step of M from system state i. We define iter as the
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Figure 2: An illustration of the distributed language iter
collection of configurations (G, x) representing two sequences of iterations of a function fM on
different inputs a and b (see Figure 2).
More precisely, let M be a Turing machine, and let a and b be two non-negative integers.
We define the following family of configurations — cf. Figure 2. A configuration in iter mainly
consists in a path P with a special node v, called the pivot, identified in this path. So P = LvR
where L and R are subpaths, respectively called left path and right path. All nodes of the path
are given the machine M as input, and the pivot v is also given a and b as inputs. The node of
the left path (resp., right path) at distance i from v is given a value fi,L (resp., fi,R) as input.
To be in the language, it is required that, for every i, fi,L = f
(i)
M (a) and fi,R = f
(i)
M (b), where
g(i) denotes the ith iterated of a function g. Let u` and ur be the two nodes at the extremity
of the left path and of the right path, respectively. The configuration is in the language if and
only if the f -values at both extremities of the path P are 0 or 1, and at least one of them is
equal to 0. That is, the configuration is in the language if and only if:
(f|L|,L ∈ {0, 1} and f|R|,R ∈ {0, 1}) and (f|L|,L = 0 or f|R|,R = 0). (2)
In fact, for technical reasons, it is also required that both |L| and |R| are powers of 2. Indeed,
on top of L and R are two complete binary trees TL and TR, respectively, with horizontal paths
connecting nodes of the same depth in each tree (see Figure 2). The nodes of L and R are the
leaves of these two trees. Finally, every node u of the graph receives as input a pair of labels
(`1, `2) ∈ {0, 1, 2}2. The label `1 is the distance modulo 3 from u to the right-most node (resp.,
left-most node) of the path if u is an internal node of TL (resp., TR), and, for nodes in the path
P , `1 is simply the distance modulo 3 from the pivot v. The label `2 is the height of the node
in its tree modulo 3. (The pivot, which belongs to none of the trees, has height 0).
A configuration (G, x) ∈ iter if and only if (G, x) satisfies all the above conditions with
respect to the given machine M . Let us consider a weaker version of iter, denoted by iter−
where the condition of Eq. (2) is replaced by just: f|L|,L ∈ {0, 1} and f|R|,R ∈ {0, 1}. Thanks to
the labeling (`1, `2) at each node, which “rigidifies” the structure, we have iter
− ∈ LD using
the same arguments as the ones in [4]. Moreover, iter ∈ ΠLOC1 . To see why, we describe a local
algorithm A using certificates. The algorithm first checks whether (G, x) ∈ iter−. All nodes,
but the pivot v, decide according to this checking. If the pivot rejected (G, x) ∈ iter−, then it
rejects in A as well. Otherwise, it carries on its decision process by interpreting its certificate
as a non-negative integer k, and accepts in A unless f (k)M (a) = 1 and f (k)M (b) = 1. To show
the correctness of A, let (G, x) ∈ iter. We have f|L|,L = 0 or f|R|,R = 0, i.e., f (|L|)M (a) = 0 or
f
(|R|)
M (b) = 0. W.l.o.g., assume f
(|L|)
M (a) = 0. If k ≥ |L| then f (k)M (a) = 0 since fM (0) = 0, and
thus v accepts. If k < |L| then f (k)M (a) 6= 1 since fM (1) = 1, and thus v accepts. Therefore, all
certificates lead to acceptance. Let us now consider (G, x) /∈ iter. If (G, x) /∈ iter− then at
least one node rejects, independently of the certificate. So, we assume that (G, x) ∈ iter−\iter.
Thus, f
(|L|)
M (a) = 1 and f
(|R|)
M (b) = 1. The certificate is set to k = max{|L|, |R|}. Let us assume,
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w.l.o.g., that k = |L| ≥ |R|. By this setting, we have f (k)M (a) = 1. Moreover, since k ≥ |R|, and
since fM (1) = 1, we get that f
(k)
M (b) = 1. Therefore, A rejects, as desired. Thus, iter ∈ ΠLOC1 .
It remains to show that iter /∈ LD. Let us assume, for the purpose of contradiction, that
there exists a t-round algorithm A deciding iter. Since iter− ∈ LD, this algorithm is able to
distinguish an instance with f
(|L|)
M (a) = 1 and f
(|R|)
M (b) = 1 from instances in which f
(|L|)
M (a) 6= 1
or f
(|R|)
M (b) 6= 1. Observe that a node at distance greater than t from the pivot can gather
information related to only one of the two inputs a and b. Therefore, the distinction between
the case f
(|L|)
M (a) = 1 and f
(|R|)
M (b) = 1 and the case f
(|L|)
M (a) 6= 1 or f (|R|)M (b) 6= 1 can only be
made by a node at distance at most t from the pivot. Therefore, by simulating A at all nodes
in the ball of radius t around v, with identities between 1 and the size of the ball of radius 2t
around the pivot, a sequential algorithm can determine, given a Turing machine M , and given
a and b, whether there exist ` and r such that f
(`)
M (a) = f
(r)
M (b) = 1 or not, which is actually
Turing undecidable. This contradiction implies that, indeed, iter /∈ LD. 
4 Complement classes
Given a class C of distributed languages, the class co-C is composed of all distributed languages
L such that L¯ ∈ C, where L¯ = {(G, x) /∈ L}. For instance, co-ΠLOC1 is the class of languages L
for which there exists a local algorithm A such that, for every configuration (G, x),
(G, x) ∈ L ⇒ ∃c,∀id, ∃u ∈ V (G),A(G, x, c, id, u) = accepts;
(G, x) /∈ L ⇒ ∀c,∀id, ∀u ∈ V (G),A(G, x, c, id, u) = rejects.
Note in particular, that the rejection must now be unanimous, while the acceptance requires
only one node to accept. Let us define the following two languages: each input to every node
belongs to {true, false}, and a configuration is in and (resp., in or) if and only if the logical
conjunction (resp., disjunction) of the inputs is true. We have and = or. These two languages
enable to separate LD from its co-class. Indeed, trivially, or /∈ LD, and and ∈ LD (without
communication). The class LD∩co-LD is almost trivial. It contains simple distributed languages
such as diamk, the class of graphs with diameter at most k, for any fixed k. We have the following
separation.
Proposition 8 or ∈ co-LD \ΠLOC1 , and and ∈ LD \ co-ΠLOC1 .
Similarly, the languages alts and amos introduced in the proof of Proposition 6 enable to
separate NLD from its co-class. Indeed, alts = amos, alts is closed under lift, and amos is
not closed under lift. Moreover, consider the language exts defined at the end of Section 2.
Both exts and exts are not closed under lift. So, overall, by Lemma 4, we get:
Proposition 9 alts ∈ NLD \ co-NLD, amos ∈ co-NLD \ NLD, and exts /∈ NLD ∪ co-NLD.
More interesting is the position of the ΠLOC1 w.r.t. NLD and co-NLD:
Proposition 10 ΠLOC1 ∪ co-ΠLOC1 ⊂ NLD ∩ co-NLD, where the inclusion is strict.
Proof. From Proposition 6, we know that ΠLOC1 ⊂ NLD. We prove that co-ΠLOC1 ⊂ NLD. Let
L ∈ co-ΠLOC1 , and let A be a t-round algorithm deciding L. Let (G, x) ∈ L, and let c be a
certificate such that A accepts at all nodes. Let (G′, x′) be a t-lift of (G, x), and lift c into c′
accordingly. Then A also accepts (G′, x′), which implies that L is closed under t-lift, and thus,
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by Lemma 4, L ∈ NLD. Therefore ΠLOC1 ∪ co-ΠLOC1 ⊆ NLD∩ co-NLD. To prove that the inclusion
is strict, we consider the language tree = {(G, x) : G is a tree}. We have tree ∈ NLD since a
tree cannot be lifted. We also have tree ∈ co-NLD since a tree cannot result from a lift. (By
Lemma 4, co-NLD is the class of languages L closed down under lift, i.e., if (G, x) ∈ L is the lift
of a configuration (G′, x′), then we have (G′, x′) ∈ L). To see why tree /∈ ΠLOC1 , consider a path
and a cycle. If tree could be decided in ΠLOC1 , then the center nodes of the path must accept
for all certificates and for any identity-assignment. Hence, all degree-2 nodes that see only
degree-2 nodes in their neighborhoods accept, for all certificates. As a consequence, the cycle
will be incorrectly accepted for all certificates. Somewhat similarly, if tree could be decided in
co-ΠLOC1 , say in t-rounds, then it would mean that, in a path, the node(s) that accept(s) (with
the appropriate certificate) can only be at distance at most t from an extremity of the path.
Indeed, otherwise, one could close the path and create a cycle that will still be accepted. So,
by gluing two paths P and P ′ of length at least 2t to two antipodal nodes of a cycle C, and
by giving to the nodes of P and P ′ the certificates that lead each of them to be accepted, this
graph would be incorrectly accepted. 
5 Complete problems
In this section, we prove Theorem 2. Let G be a connected graph, and U be a set (typically,
U = {0, 1}∗). Let e : V (G) → U , and let S : V (G) → 22U . That is, e assigns an element
e(u) ∈ U to every node u ∈ V (G), and S assigns a collection of sets S(u) = {S1(u), . . . , Sku(u)}
to every node u ∈ V (G), with ku ≥ 1 and Si : V (G) → 2U for every i ≥ 1. We say that
S covers e if and only if there exists u ∈ V (G), and there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , ku}, such that
Si(u) = {e(u), u ∈ V (G)}. In [6], the authors defined the language
cover = {(G, x) : ∀u ∈ V (G), x(u) = (S(u), e(u)) such that S covers e}
and proved that cover is the “most difficult problem”, in the sense that every distributed
language can be locally reduced to cover. However cover is closed under lift as lifting does
not create new elements, while lifting preserves the sets. Therefore, by Lemma 4, cover ∈ NLD.
In fact, one can show that there exists a local verification algorithm for cover using certificates
of size quasi linear in n whenever the ground set U is of polynomial size.
Proposition 11 Let U be the ground set of cover. Then cover has a local decision algorithm
for NLD, using certificates of size O(n(log n+ log |U |)) bits.
Proof. Given (G, x) ∈ cover, where G is an n-node graph, the prover assigns the following
certificates to the nodes. For any u ∈ V (G), we have c(u) = (d0, (d1, e1), (d2, e2), . . . , (dn, en)),
where, for every i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, di is a non-negative integer, and, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ei ∈ U .
This certificate is on O(n(log n + log |U |)) bits. The di’s measure distances: d0 is the distance
from u to the node v which has a set Si(v) covering e, and, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, di is the
distance from u to a node u′ with e(u′) = ei.
The verifier acts as follows, in just one communication round. Every node u checks that
it has the same number of distance entries in its certificate as all its neighbors, and that the
ith elements coincide between neighbors, for every i = 1, . . . , n. Next, it checks that one and
only one of its distances di with i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is null, and that e(u) = ei. Next, if d0 = 0,
it checks that it has a set Sj(u) = {ei, i = 1, . . . , n}. Finally, it checks that the distances are
consistent, that is, for every i such that di 6= 0, it checks that it has at least one neighbor whose
ith distance is smaller than di. If all tests are passed, then u accepts, otherwise it rejects.
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By construction, if (G, x) ∈ cover then all nodes accept. Conversely, let us assume that
all nodes accept. Since the distances are decreasing, for each element ei there must exist at
least one node u such that x(u) = ei. Conversely, every node has its element appearing in
the certificate (because it must have one distance equal to 0). Finally, since the distance d0 is
decreasing, there must exist at least one node u that has a set Sj(u) = {ei, i = 1, . . . , n}. This
implies that (G, x) ∈ cover. 
This latter result is in contradiction with the claim in [6] regarding the hardness of cover.
The reason for this contradiction is that the local reduction used in [6] for reducing any lan-
guage to cover is too strong. Indeed, it transforms a configuration (G, x) into a configuration
(G, x′) where the certificates used for proving x′ may depend on the identities of the nodes
in G. This is in contradiction with the definitions of the classes ΣLOCk and Π
LOC
k , k ≥ 0, for
which the certificates must be independent of the identity assignment. In this section, we show
that completeness results can be obtained using a more constrained notion of reduction which
preserves the membership to the classes.
Recall from [6] that a local reduction of L to L′ is a local algorithm R which maps any
configuration (G, x) to a configuration (G, y), where y = R(G, x, id) may depend of the identity
assignment id, such that: (G, x) ∈ L if and only if, for every identity assignment id to the nodes
of G, (G, y) ∈ L′ where y = R(G, x, id). Ideally, we would like R the be identity-oblivious,
that is, such that the output of each node does not depend on the identity assignment. We
use a concept somewhat intermediate between identity-oblivious reduction and the unconstraint
reduction in [6].
Definition 12 Let C be a class of distributed languages, and let L and L′ be two distributed
languages. Let A be a C-algorithm deciding L′, and let R be a local reduction of L to L′. We
say that (R,A) is label-preserving for (L,L′) if and only if, for any configuration (G, x), the
certificates used by the prover in A for (G, y) where y = R(G, x, id) are the same for all identity
assignments id to G.
The following result shows that the notion of reduction in Definition 12 preserves the classes
of distributed languages.
Lemma 13 Let C be a class of distributed languages. Let L and L′ be two distributed languages
with L′ ∈ C, and let (R,A) be a label-preserving local reduction for (L,L′). Then L ∈ C.
Proof. We describe a local algorithm B for deciding L in C. In essence, B = A ◦ R. More
precisely, let (G, x) be a configuration, with an arbitrary identity assignment id, and let y =
R(G, x, id). Let c be a certificate assigned by the prover in A for configuration (G, y). (Note that
this certificate may depend on some previously set certificates, as in, e.g., ΠLOC1 ). The certificate
assigned by the prover in B for configuration (G, x) is c. The algorithm B then proceeds as
follows. Given (G, x), it computes (G, y) using R, and then applies A on (G, y) using the
certificates constructed by the prover in B. Algorithm B then outputs the decision taken by
A. Since R preserves the membership to the languages, and since the certificates assigned by
the prover in A for configurations resulting from the application of R are independent of the
identity assignment, the certificates chosen under the identity assignment id are also appropriate
for any other identity assignment id′. This guarantees the correctness of B, and thus L ∈ C. 
In the following problem, every node u of a configuration (G, x) is given a family F(u) of
configurations, each described by an adjacency matrix representing a graph, and a 1-dimensional
array representing the inputs to the nodes of that graph. In addition, every node u has an input
string x′(u) ∈ {0, 1}∗. Hence, (G, x′) is also a configuration. The actual configuration (G, x)
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is legal if (G, x′) is missing in all families F(u) for every u ∈ V (G), i.e., (G, x′) /∈ F where
F = ∪u∈V (G)F(u). In short, we consider the language
miss = {(G, x) : ∀u ∈ V (G), x(u) = (F(u), x′(u)) and (G, x′) /∈ F}
We show that miss is among the hardest problems, under local label-preserving reductions.
Note that miss /∈ NLD (it is not closed under lift: it may be the case that (G, x′) /∈ F but a lift
of (G, x′) is in F).
Proposition 14 miss is ΠLOC2 -complete for local label-preserving reductions.
Proof. Let L be a distributed language. We describe a local label-preserving reduction (R,A)
for (L,miss) with respect to ΠLOC2 .
In essence, the local algorithm A for deciding miss in ΠLOC2 is the generic algorithm described
in the proof of Proposition 3. Recall that, in this generic algorithm, on a legal configuration
(G, x), the existential c2 certificate in A is pointing to an inconsistency in the given c1 certificate
which is supposed to describe the configuration (G, x). And, on an illegal configuration (G, x),
the existential c1 certificate in A does provide an accurate description of the configuration
(G, x). For the purpose of label-preservation, we slightly modify the generic algorithm for miss.
Instead of viewing c1 as a description of the configuration (G, x), the algorithm views it as a
description of (G, x′) where, at each node u, x′(u) is the second item in x(u) (the first item is
the family F(u)). The algorithm is then exactly the same as the generic algorithm with the
only modification that the test when the flag f(u) = 1 is not regarding whether (G, x′) ∈ miss,
but whether (G, x′) /∈ F(u). On a legal configuration, all nodes accept. On an illegal instance,
a node with (G, x′) ∈ F(u) rejects.
The reduction R from L to miss proceeds as follows, in a way similar to the one in [6]. A
node u with identity id(u) and input x(u) computes its width ω(u) = 2|id(u)|+|x(u)| where |s|
denotes the length of a bit-string s. Then u generates all configurations (H, y) /∈ L such that
H has at most ω(u) nodes and y(v) has value at most ω(u), for every node v of H. It places
all these configurations in F(u). The input x′(u) is simply x′(u) = x(u). If (G, x) ∈ L, then
(G, x) /∈ F since only illegal instances are in F , and thus (G,R(G, x)) ∈ miss. Conversely, if
(G, x) /∈ L, then (G,R(G, x)) /∈ miss. Indeed, there exists at least one node u with identity
id(u) ≥ n, which guarantees that u generates the graph G. If no other node u′ has width
ω(u′) > n then u generates (G, x) ∈ F(u). If there exists a node u′ with ω(u′) > n then u′
generates (G, x) ∈ F(u′). In each case, we have (G, x) ∈ F , and thus (G,R(G, x)) /∈ miss.
It remains to show that the existential certificate used in A for all configurations (G,R(G, x))
are the same for any given (G, x), independently of the identity assignment to G used to perform
the reduction R. This directly follows from the nature of A since the certificates do not depend
on the families F(u)’s but only on the bit strings x′(u)’s. 
The following language is defined as miss by replacing F by the closure under lift F↑ of F .
That is, F↑ is composed of F and all the lifts of the configurations in F .
miss↑ = {(G, x) : ∀u ∈ V (G), x(u) = (F(u), x′(u)) and (G, x′) /∈ F↑}
We show that miss↑ is the hardest problem in NLD.
Proposition 15 miss↑ is NLD-complete (and miss↑ is co-NLD-complete) under label-preserving
reduction.
Proof. We do have miss↑ ∈ NLD because miss↑ is closed under lift. Let L ∈ NLD. The reduction
R from L to miss↑ is the same as the one in the proof of Proposition 14. We describe a local
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algorithm for deciding miss↑ in NLD which is label-preserving with respect to R. The certificate
c(u) is a description of (G, x′) of the form (M(u),data(u), index(u)) as certificate c1 in the proof
of Proposition 3. This guarantees label-preservation with respect to R. For the verification part,
each node u checks whether (M(u), data(u), index(u)) fits with its local neighborhood. If no,
it rejects. Otherwise, it checks whether (M(u), data(u)) /∈ F(u)↑, accepts if yes, and rejects
otherwise. On a legal configuration (G, x) ∈ miss↑, with the correct certificate c = (G, x′), all
nodes accept. On an illegal configuration (G, x) /∈ miss↑, there are two cases. If (M(u),data(u))
is neither (G, x′) nor a lift of (G, x′), then some node will detect an inconsistency, and reject. If
(M(u),data(u)) is an accurate description of (G, x′) or of a lift of (G, x′), then some node will
detect that (M(u),data(u)) ∈ F↑(u), and therefore will reject. 
6 Conclusion
Our investigation raises several intriguing questions. In particular, identifying a distributed
language in ΠLOC1 \ LD was an uneasy task. We succeeded to find one such language, but we
were unable to identify a ΠLOC1 -complete problem, if any. In fact, completeness results are very
sensitive to the type of local reductions that is used. We have identified label-preserving local
reduction as an appropriate notion. It would be interesting to know whether NLD-complete and
ΠLOC2 -complete languages exist for identity-oblivious reductions. This latter type of reductions
is indeed the most natural one in a context in which nodes may not want to leak information
about their identities. It is easy to see that the class co-LD has a complete language for identity-
oblivious reductions, namely, or is co-LD-complete for identity-oblivious reductions. However,
we do not know whether this can be achieved for NLD or ΠLOC2 .
This paper is aiming at providing a proof of concept for the notion of interactive local veri-
fication: ΠLOC2 can be viewed as the interaction between two players, with conflicting objectives,
one is aiming at proving the instance, while the other is aiming at disproving it. As a conse-
quence, for this first attempt, we voluntarily ignored important parameters such as the size of
the certificates, and the individual computation time, and we focussed only on the locality issue.
The impact of limiting the certificate size was recently investigated in [2]. Regarding the indi-
vidual computation time, our completeness results involve local reductions that are very much
time consuming at each node. Insisting on local reductions involving polynomial-time compu-
tation at each node is crucial for practical purpose. At this point, we do not know whether non
trivial hardness results can be established under polynomial-time local reductions. Proving or
disproving the existence of such hardness results is let as an open problem.
Acknowledgement: The authors are thankful to Laurent Feuilloley for fruitful discussions
about the topic of the paper.
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